Showing posts with label musharaf. Show all posts
Showing posts with label musharaf. Show all posts

Monday, 17 March 2008

Thoughts on the Other Musharraf

Some well-intentioned advice to my Bangladeshi friends:

Some years ago, you decided to part ways with Pakistan. As traumatic as that episode was, in hindsight, it was probably for the best. It seems though, that the military-bureaucratic elite can't quite break the mould in which it was originally cast and it is leading Bangladesh down the same, dusty, well-beaten path that Pakistan has trod so many times before. I would urge you very strongly to reconsider. This path will take you nowhere you want to go...

Friday, 11 January 2008

Who Killed Bhutto? [Part II]

And the rumour mill has, as usual, gone wild, with all sorts of conspiracy theories making the rounds regarding who killed Benazir Bhutto. Some claim it was Musharraf. Some claim it was her husband, Zardari. Some allege it was the Chaudhries. Some claim it was part of a larger American plot. No, others claim, its actually an Indian conspiracy....

As addicted as we are to conspiracy theories, I suppose it was inevitable that these kinds of conspiracy theories would proliferate. But the circumstances of the medical report and outlandish claims by the government immediately following the assassination have added grist to the mill. Its sad really.

Here is a STRATFOR article, reprinted at Teeth Maestro's blog, summarizing the political situation in Pakistan and examining the theory that Musharraf had something to do with the murder. It very rightly points out that Musharraf had everything to lose and little to gain from Bhutto's death.

Friday, 28 December 2007

What Next?

I had been gearing up to write a post on the coming elections, the possible outcomes and what they might mean for the country, but the assassination of Benazir Bhutto seems to have thrown all the old equations out of the window.

So what will happen now?

The immediate reaction from the western press seems to be one of doom and gloom. 'Pakistan stares into the Abyss' says one experienced and usually level-headed blogger; 'Tentative steps towards democracy may become headlong rush into political chaos' warns the Guardian; the USA Today feels that Pakistan's best hope of 'becoming a stable democracy anytime soon may have died with Benazir Bhutto'. BBC is a little more circumspect, calling the assassination a 'severe blow to hope for stability' and asking 'what next for Pakistan'? CNN was constantly abuzz with discussion over what this means for the 'War on Terror' with repeated references to nuclear weapons and Islamist militants.

My own view of the situation is firstly, no, Pakistan is not going to immediately fall apart and leave nukes in the hands of Islamist militants. Secondly, yes, this is a severe blow to hopes for stability and Pakistan is headed for a political crisis. As for reversals for democracy, well, one is hard pressed to describe the previous political process in which Benazir was involved, as a movement towards 'stable democracy'.

This is not to say that our political leaders might not still manage to drag the entire nation into chaos - its possible I suppose, given the state of affairs and the seemingly miraculous ability of our political leaders to really make a mess of things. However, that will require some effort and a whole series of mis-steps.

For the immediate future, I think this leaves Musharraf's political future in deep trouble. Make no mistake, the man himself may survive, but I think hopes for taking serious measures to tackle extremism in the country could only have happened with political support from the PPP. There are certainly close advisers of Musharraf and people in the military who don't feel that the PPP is needed, but these people seem to spout such delusional fantasies of their own accomplishments, that they either have a very loose grip on reality or they are more interested in self-serving hypocrisy than tackling militancy.

All this is quiet apart from the fact that most people are holding Musharraf personally responsible and in the current climate of outrage and anger, various politicians may sense blood and try to bring him down. Nawaz Sharif seems to have already unsheathed his knives by announcing the PML-N will not take part in elections. Having lost the prop of being the army chief, and with his own political party, the PML-Q consisting of a band of mercenaries, Musharraf is at his most vulnerable. So far both these pillars of his authority seem to be standing by him, but it remains to be seen if they will do so if push comes to shove. Furthermore its not immediately clear who will take over the reins of power in the PPP now that Bhutto is gone, and if Musharraf will be able to make a deal with them. The three names being mentioned so far are Makhdoom Amin Fahim, Asif Zardari and Aitizaz Ahsan.

Makhdoom Amin Fahim is the titular head of the PPP, but he was in this position precisely because he was a 'yes-man' - someone who Benazir could trust to follow orders while she was in exile, and without a very strong base within the party apparatus. Asif Zardari seems to be maneuvering to take his late wife's position, and he can rely on his marital connection for mass support, but if he were to lead the PPP, one simply cannot see Musharraf coming to a political accommodation with him. It would be the height of hypocrisy for a president who took power with the promise to deliver accountability and honesty to form a political alliance with the man reputed to be the most corrupt in the country. As for the third candidate, Aitizaz Ahsan, who is still languishing under house arrest; he has been the most outspoken voice against the military and Musharraf in the country over the last year, and he is unlikely to enter into any kind of political arrangement with Musharraf.

One possibility is that Makhdoom Amin Fahim may become a compromise candidate to lead the party between different factions within the party. If this were to happen, some kind of political accommodation between the PPP and Musharraf would still be on the cards.

But of course all this conjecture is based on 2 assumptions, neither of which can be taken for granted:

The assumption is that Musharraf is serious about tackling militancy and is clear-eyed enough to understand what this will entail. Its possible that he doesn't feel militancy is a serious problem, or that a few missile strikes and the doling out of massive quantities of bribe money will "end militancy". Needless to say these tactics have been failing miserably for the last 5 years and will fail miserably again.

The second assumption is that Musharraf still has full control over decision-making within the military-PML-Q setup. Some observers speculate that he has already become something of a lame duck, dependent on the COAS and senior PML-Q leaders. If the PML-Q bigwigs are exerting more influence these days, the idea of an alliance with the PPP may be stillborn.

But that is mere speculation. Right now its still difficult to see where the chips may fall.

Edit: I came across this article in the IHT which echoes a few of the points I've made.

Thursday, 29 November 2007

On Musharraf's Resignation

Musharraf, as expected, and about 5 years too late, resigned from his post of Chief of Army Staff. W.H. Auden expressed it so much better than I:

Epitaph on a Tyrant

Perfection, of a kind, was what he was after,
And the poetry he invented was easy to understand;
He knew human folly like the back of his hand,
And was greatly interested in armies and fleets;
When he laughed, respectable senators burst with laughter,
And when he cried the little children died in the streets.


January 1939

Monday, 19 November 2007

Bibi, Kayani, Sharif, Mush and Bush: Round and Round They Go...

Over the weekend the recently engineered deal between Musharraf and Bhutto seemed to fall apart - apparently because Bhutto had taken to gleeful grandstanding while the anti-Emergency agitation was at its peak. Musharraf, a man with a legendary stubborn streak that does not respond well to pressure tactics, shoved right back. The deal brokered by the United States in an attempt to engineer a political solution to Musharraf's domestic woes and counter internal criticism that the Bush government was pandering to dictators while touting its "freedom agenda" elsewhere in the Muslim world was apparently under threat of collapsing altogether.

But it was essential to cobble some kind of deal together. Hence, the following sequence of events...

13th Nov: General Kayani's name starts being dropped in the American press as "a man widely admired within the Pakistani military and by members of Pakistani civil society." I'm not certain which members of Pakistani civil society they are talking about.

14th Nov: An article in the NYT, citing unnamed administration officials, says that the United States is looking at other options in Pakistan. The article not so casually name drops General Kayani.

14th Nov (Night-time) : Musharraf immediately amends the PCO to remove the power to lift the Emergency from the post of Military chief to that of President. It looks like transferring power from himself to himself. But it highlights and suggests a fear of the next Military Chief (Kayani) when he himself retires and becomes a civilian President.

15th Nov: State Department says that Negroponte will be going to Pakistan to "get Pakistan back on the road to constitutional democratic rule."

15th Nov (Night-time): The detention order for house-arrest of Benazir Bhutto is lifted hours before Negroponte arrives.

15th Nov: Analysts debate whether the United States is actually switching to support Kayani, or whether these leaks are orchestrated by the anti-Musharaf group in the Republican administration that has formed around Zalmay Khalizdad, trying to build pressure on the Bush administration to stop supporting Musharraf and switch to another power configuration in Pakistan.

16th Nov: Negroponte arrives in Pakistan for talks. He shuttles between various officials, meeting Musharraf and Kayani (twice) and talks to Benazir Bhutto as well.

16th Nov (Night-time): Nawaz Sharif calls on BB to "clarify her position" with regards to talks with Musharraf.

17th Nov: After a meeting with Negroponte, Musharraf agrees that all parties will be able to take part in elections, but that the Emergency will have to stay for the time being. Afterwards he flies to Karachi. Rumours of a prospective meeting between BB and Negroponte are dashed when BB also leaves for Karachi. Negroponte ignores a request for a meeting with lawyers.

17th or 18th Nov: Musharraf meets Benazir on Saturday night or Sunday.

18th Nov: Negroponte issues a statement from Pakistan calling for: elections, removal of uniform, release of political detainees and lifting of curbs on the media. No mention of the judiciary. In a pointed remark to BB, he calls for an end to political 'brinkmanship'.

18th Nov: Benazir gives an interview to CNN where she softens her stance and states that Musharraf is an honest man, and that she is 'waiting for' Musharraf to respond to Negroponte's message from Washington. She also says she was 'satisfied' by the U.S.'s message to Musharraf.

18th Nov: After the announcement that Musharraf intends to visit Saudi Arabia, speculation is rife that Nawaz Sharif may finally be willing to meet with Musharraf, something he apparently has refused to do previously.

19th Nov: In an article in the LA Times that boldly states that Musharraf resisted U.S. calls to end the Emergency is buried this little statement: "U.S. officials in Washington, speaking on condition of anonymity out of deference to Negroponte's diplomatic efforts, said that although Musharraf didn't make any commitments Saturday, they believed he might in time yield."

19th Nov: Supreme Court kicks out 5 of 6 challenges to Musharraf's election as President. The case filed by the PPP leader Makhdoom Amin Fahim is withdrawn voluntarily, underlining the de-escalation in the war of words between Bhutto and Musharraf.

And so the road to Musharraf's assuming the Presidency, removing his uniform, and reforming some kind of modus operandi with the PPP has been cleared, thanks to the efforts of the United States. What's interesting is that in an interview with a reporter for the Sunday Times, Musharraf's Attorney General had also threatened to revoke the NRO that granted Bhutto immunity from corruption charges. This was, obviously, reported on Sunday (18th Nov) but the article doesn't specify when in the previous week he made this threat. I'm guessing around the 15th, when BB was still in captivity.

Whats interesting is that in the same article, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain claims that the immunity for Bhutto is a ploy to divide the opposition. I reckon the PML(Q) will continue to campaign on an anti-Bhutto agenda, presenting her as a depraved, corrupt agent of America (not far wrong), out to destroy Islam and Pakistan, with the only hope being the PML(Q). Having said that, if Nawaz were to return, that would be a serious blow to the PML(Q). Much of Punjab is united in its dislike of Bhutto, but in a fair fight, the PML(N) may still give Q a run for its money.

Our Great Military Victories

Looking through bits and pieces that I wrote over the last few months, but never went on to complete and post, I came across this unfinished piece about the Musharraf government's capitulations to militants and the largest loss of sovereign Pakistani soil after the loss of East Pakistan in 1971. The article remains unfinished, and perhaps in some ways, now outdated, but I'm posting it up anyway since very few people in Pakistan seem to know about or even acknowledge the carving out of an independent state in our northern areas.

As a soldier, Musharraf supposedly had an outstanding record. Unfortunately as a commander, his record seems to be rather woeful. Apart from the Kargil fiasco, which was a neatly planned tactical exercise, but dangerously foolish strategic blunder that ended in defeat on the battlefield, two separate campaigns in Waziristan have met ignominious ends, and Swat has been a source of severe embarrassment. Lets hope the current army "operation" there has better results. Initial reports from the military sound a positive tone, though I'm highly suspicious of these body counts of air strikes and artillery barrages. How can the army be sure of how many people they are killing, and, more importantly, whether they actually are militants or simply local civillians caught in the crossfire?

I suppose I am ranging far from the purported topic of this post, but I do want to add a little note about the Kargil war. I have heard some people defend the little adventure by stating that the war caused far more Indian casualties than it did Pakistani, that it "jolted" the Indians by showing them that the Pakistani army were still a force to be reckoned with, that it "internationalized the Kashmir issue" (whatever that means) and that it helped "bleed" the Indian army and economy.

These arguments remind me of the English generals of the First World War who defended the Battle of the Somme as a great victory for the British against the Germans, worth the cost of lives lost. The brainchild of the plan, General Haig threw wave after wave of British and French troops against the German trenches at the Somme. After four and a half months, a strip of land 25 km long and 6 km wide had been taken. There were 420,000 British casualties, 200,000 French casualties and 500,000 German casualties. The good General argued that he had won a great victory because he had "bled" the German army, diverted their attention from other fronts, and put them on the defensive. The public and media were appalled because they had been led to believe the promised "great victory" would result in something quiet different. The question some historians ask, is whether the political leaders of Europe would have been more willing to open negotiations if they had not kept being reassured of the coming "great victories" by their military generals.

The repeated attempts at an 'all-or-nothing' military solution to political problems have parallels with the clumsy attempts at directing Pakistan's foreign policy by the military. Perhaps most telling was how Kargill slammed the door shut on the negotiations over Kashmir that had been ongoing at the time between the Vajpayee and Sharif governments. These talks were based around the so-called Livingston Plan through which "a portion of the former princely State of Jammu and Kashmir should be reconstituted as a sovereign entity (but one without an international personality) enjoying free access to and from both India and Pakistan". This was the closest that India ever came in its history to a settlement of the Kashmir issue. According to the analyst, Hassan Abbas, these negotiations had started in March, 1999, and after being briefed about them, Musharraf had called them a good starting point. In May, the Kargil operation was launched, torpedoing the negotiations and till this day, shutting the door on any further negotiations on Kashmir by the Indians.

Truly a great military victory.

Friday, 16 November 2007

On Musharraf and Imran

Ayaz Aamir writes in Dawn:
“Have you thought of (resigning)?” asks Sky News. The answer: “But should it be given up now and we will have better Pakistan, a stabler Pakistan and we could have very good elections, without me? Very good, maybe I take that decision, OK?” (No kidding, the very words.)

As the BBC Urdu Service’s Mohammad Hanif observes (in his hilarious “The case of Musharraf and the drunk uncle”), “Musharraf deserves our sympathy. Not because he has been forced to carry out a coup against his own regime, not because his troops are being kidnapped en masse by Pakistani Taliban and then awarded Rs500 for good behaviour, not because he himself has become a prisoner in his Army House and can’t even nip out for coffee and paan as he used to, but because he has utterly lost his grip over grammar.”

A hilarious article. He goes on to write about the IJT's handing Imran Khan over to the police:

If May 12 exposed the true face of the MQM, Nov 14 has revealed the ugly face of the Jamiat and the Jamaat. Qazi Hussein Ahmed’s populist posturing had led many simpleminded souls to believe that the Jamaat had changed its spots. The incident with Imran dispels such illusions.

There seems to be a lot of anger about the IJT's betrayal of Imran Khan. There was a major demonstration against the IJT at Punjab University, with many members resigning and some pretty fiery speeches. This is a major step because the IJT has come to dominate many government university campuses, particularly in the Punjab, usually with the connivance of the administration. Several of Punjab University's top administrative officials are former IJT members.

Monday, 5 November 2007

A Conversion and a Confirmation

It would seem as if Mr Ali Eteraz, who wrote a fawning apology for Musharaf in his article on the Guardian website, which I criticized here, has already repented.

Meanwhile it seems as if as far back as in 2002, it had become apparent that the much-touted Madressa reform policy of the Musharaf government was heading for failure. This report by the International Crisis Group spells out its shortcomings. It pretty much confirms my own assessment of the Madressah reforms.

Friday, 22 June 2007

Sir Rushdie and the PML-Q's New Election Strategy

These days PML-Q party leaders must be heaving sighs of relief and sending up prayers of thanks to the Almighty. In between, that is, their ever more extraordinary fulminations of gleeful outrage over the Rushdie knighthood. Finally, there may be a way to derail what had looked like an increasingly inevitable election defeat.

Things started to fall apart for Musharraf and the 'King's Party' (as the PML-Q is known) in March when Musharraf had the Chief Justice dismissed for alleged nepotism (and more absurdly, travelling in a helicopter at government expense). The real reason was that according to the constitutional amendments that Musharraf and the King's party had pushed through, with the help of the MMA, (a coalition of Islamic parties) the post of Army Chief and President could not be combined beyond 2007. An attempt by Musharraf to get elected as President would see a legal challenge which would have been decided by the Supreme Court. Musharraf had to ensure that the SC ruling would be on his side. Since Military Intelligence spies on all the members of the SC, Musharraf presumably had information about which way the Chief Justice would rule if a legal challenge were issued.

This backfired in a big way, with most of the legal community coming out on to the streets to protest and insist on the independence of the judiciary. The heavy-handed response by the police against the peaceful protesters, and the heavy media coverage of this response sparked further outrage. Suddenly civil society seemed to be coming out on the streets against military rule.
A rally turns out to greet the Chief Justice (image: BBC)

Opposition parties quickly caught on and tethered themselves to the extraordinary support for the Chief Justice. Protests grew in size and volume. When an attempt to have a rally in Karachi was brutally suppressed by the gunmen from the government aligned MQM party, outrage flared anew. The media was full of outspoken attacks on the government and Musharraf's attempt to curb media freedoms further backfired, even drawing fire from outside the country as well. The government quickly had to back-pedal on the restrictions. To top it all off, the PML-Q was in utter disarray.

The PML-Q was always a rickety coalition of disparate interests. Composed for the most part of professional "lotas" - candidates with secure seats in their localities who sell their party membership to the highest bidder - there is little ideological glue that binds them together. A few are genuine supporters of Musharraf and his ideals of "enlightened moderation", but for the most part they are sell-swords who had realised after the overthrow of the Nawaz government (of which most of them were a part) which side of the bread was buttered.

With election disaster now looming, the PML-Q looked to be crumbling. Mir Zafarullah Jamali, who had been Musharraf's first pick for the post of Prime Minister, quit the ruling party, criticising the party he had formerly led, and calling for a new constitution that clearly laid out the limits of the army's role in the government. Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz publicly attacked members of the party for their lack of support during the ongoing crisis. While opposition MNAs vociferously attacked the government on TV talk shows, members of the PML-Q either declined invitations to appear or mounted lukewarm defences of government actions, perhaps afraid of becoming alienated from any future ruling coalition. More tellingly, a minister leaked the increasingly isolated Musharraf's ticking off of his administration at a closed door meeting of the cabinet. "You always leave me alone in time of trial and tribulation," he is reported to have said, "I feel disturbed for the first time." Members of the ruling party responded by saying that they had put their careers on the line to support Musharraf, but were not consulted in key decisions. Welcome to the military mindset, one might well have replied.

Former Prime Minister Jamali quit the PML-Q (Image: Daily Times)

There had already been discontent within the party over the proposed "deal" between Musharraf and the PPP. Acknowledging that the PPP would probably win the popular vote in coming elections, Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto were widely known to be negotiating a deal in which Bhutto would be allowed to run for elections and outstanding corruption charges against her would be dropped clearing the way for her to become the new Prime Minister. In return Bhutto would support his candidacy for President and form a coalition government with the PML-Q. These negotiations were still ongoing, with Musharraf's desire to retain his army post as the sticking point, when the storm over the Chief Justice broke. When the PPP, after some initial hesitation, finally threw its lot in with the Chief Justice, these negotiations broke down and Musharraf in a pique of anger declared that, despite his former statements, he would not allow Benaizir Bhutto to return to the country and run for elections.

This now left Musharraf in a bind. If he couldn't rely on PPP votes in parliament to get him re-elected, where was he going to turn? The first step was to reassure PML-Q party members. The second was to cast about for another party willing to ally itself with the PML-Q. The obvious answer would be the MMA.

The MMA is a coalition of a spectrum of Islamist parties. It has its more democratically-minded wing in the JI (Jamaat-i-Islami) but generally the MMA has been happy to work with the PML-Q and Musharraf even while condemning him for his pro-western stance and his stated ideal of "enlightened moderation". It was the MMA that had provided desperately needed votes to get the constitutional changes that cemented Musharraf in power in previous years. The military had also helped the MMA sweep elections in the two provinces of NWFP and Baluchistan in 2002 by banning their main opponents, the nationalist ANP and other Baluch nationalist parties from campaigning. The MMA and PML-Q are coalition partners in the Baluchistan provincial legislature. Finally many of the current PML-Q and MMA leaders had been part of coalition governments in previous years from the time of Zia-ul-Haq onwards.

The major stumbling block was that the MMA and the government were at loggerheads over the involvement of Pakistan in the 'war on terror'. Pakistan's stop-start operations against the Taleban and Al-Qaeda elements in the country were a function not just of American pressure to produce results, or the ISI's desire to maintain a Jihadist network for use against India, but also the government's desire to not completely alienate MMA support. For their part, the MMA feared losing elections to resurgent Pakhtun and Baluch nationalist parties, buoyed by widespread outrage at the MMA's support of the Pakistani army's brutal suppression of Baluchi nationalists in a dirty civil war whose embers are still flickering. Ultimately, the Pakistan army's defeat and humiliating retreat from Waziristan paved the way for an end of military operations and a series of MMA-sponsored deals with militants that have ceded sovereignty over large tracts of Pakistani territory to bodies such as the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan.

Baluch nationalists at a gathering of tribal chiefs in 2006 (Image: Worldpress.org)

But can the MMA make a switch when they have so publicly and loudly decried Musharraf and his government? Furthermore, both the MMA and the PPP are ostensibly members of 'grand party alliance' to restore democracy, how can the MMA justify a break with the PPP when they both have the same declared aims? And on what issue can the PML-Q hope to mobilise support and try and slow the momentum that has built during the countrywide demonstrations against the military government?

Like an angel sent from heaven to offer deliverance, enter Salman Rushdie and his knighthood.

The thing about populist demagoguery about non-issues is that it has no logic, and often its a safe band-wagon to hitch your horses to. What's interesting is that all of these people who are insisting that they will become suicide bombers or assassins and so forth are all from the governing PML-Q party. And look who they are targeting in their speeches.

So you have some women in the Punjab Provincial Assembly indulging in some sloganeering: “Rushdie ki tasveer, Benazir Benazir.” (Rushdie's splitting image: Benazir, Benazir!) You also have the Sindh Chief Minister, Dr Arbab Ghulam Rahim, a truly odious man, taking the brave self-sacrificing step of renouncing his deceased grandfather's knighthood. To top off the show, he reminded the world that Benazir Bhutto's grandfather was also a knight of the realm and insisted that if she were a true Muslim, she too would renounce her grandfather's knighthood.

Arbab Ghulam Rahim shows off his grandpappy's medals. (Image: Dawn)

At least both their grandfathers worked together in rendering services to the British Empire. On the other hand, the man whose father had Benazir's father murdered, Ejaz-ul-Haq, alleged that Benazir had "contacts" with Rushdie - the impression given that these contacts were of an intimate nature. According to Dawn, "Mr Haq said he and millions of Muslims were ready to sacrifice their lives and everything else to protect the sanctity of the Holy Prophet (PBUH)." Then, just in case someone took him literally, " He said he had never supported suicide bombing."

What better way to create an "issue" to rally people around and attack the PPP on? What better way to distract attention from all the other issues confronting the country today? What better way to draw the MMA and PML-Q together? 'Defending' Islam might just be the gimmick that will allow the two parties to weather the coming elections intact.

IZ

Edit: And now the Prime Minister has gotten in on the act. The National Assembly, meanwhile has passed a second resolution condemning Rushdie and the British government. How much political miliage are they going to try and squeeze from this?

Sunday, 17 June 2007

Pakistan News Blogs and NAB

I came across a very interesting blog that basically reprints news articles about Pakistan news, current affairs etc. called Watandost. I've added it to my blogroll. Interestingly the blog is maintained by Hassan Abbas, the former NAB official who is currently at Tufts and is the author of 'Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism.'

Also check out excerpts from his 2004 Dawn article on the rise and fall of NAB here. (Its the second article in the post.) Its very very informative and makes for interesting reading on how NAB became THE repository for both the hopes of all the people who thought Musharaf would be good for Pakistan, as well as a justification for Musharaf's rule.

Abbas shows how NAB was caught in a catch 22 situation because Musharraf need it to at least appear to be successful to show that he was making good on his promises to 'clean up' Pakistan while also cutting deals with the very people NAB was investigating in order to consolidate his hold on power. Also, NAB was a new institution with very little funding or experience in investigative techniques. To bolster it and speed up the visibility of its functioning a new set of ordinances that undermined judicial procedure were promulgated and the ISI and other intelligence agencies were turned to in order to provide funding and manpower.

Needless to say this was not good for NAB in the long run. Nor for the country.

IZ

P.S. Another Pakistan news blog with a decidedly pro-democracy slant is Civil Society Pakistan.

Saturday, 16 June 2007

Keeping the Story Straight

Looking through bits and pieces that I wrote over the last few months, but never went on to complete and post, I came across this unfinished piece about the Musharraf government's capitulations to militants and the largest loss of sovereign Pakistani soil following military defeat behind the loss of East Pakistan in 1971. It remains unfinished, and perhaps in some ways, now redundant, but I'm posting it here anyway since very few people in Pakistan seem to know about or even acknowledge the carving out of an independent state in our northern areas:

11/6/2007

The Musharraf administration have obviously not learned anything from the Bush government. While it has been acknowledged universally by the media, analysts, think tanks, intelligence officials, government bureaucrats and even low level administration officials in the U.S. that there really was no connection between Saddam's Iraq and Al Qaeda, Bush, Cheney and the top ranks have stuck to their guns, repeating endlessly the lie that there was a link. Such stubborn discipline in the face of reality is truly admirable.

Alas discipline is not a prime quality of the Musharraf administration. For years it has been the party line that there is no Al Qaeda in Pakistan. There were stragglers, foreigners, miscreants and the odd sympathizer but no significant Al Qaeda presence. Needless to say that it has been acknowledged universally by the media, analysts, think tanks, intelligence officials etc. that there is a very significant Al Qaeda presence in Pakistan, dug in in the tribal areas. In fact, last month Musharraf himself stated that "Al -Qaeda is in our mountains, in Mir Ali. This is completely true."

Was the government finally facing up to reality? If so, no one told the Foreign Office, which only a few days strongly rejected the claim that there were Al Qaeda bases in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Not quiet on the same page, are we?

But given the actual situation in NWFP and the tribal areas, perhaps the administration can be forgiven for not always knowing what lies to tell and which lies are now redundant. Given the military defeat of the Pakistani army and its retreat from the tribal areas last year, and the humiliating terms it had to sign with the Taliban and Talibanesque fringe groups, the fact of the matter is that Pakistan has actually lost control of the largest chunk of its territory since the ill-fated 1971 war. 2006 was the year that the 'Islamic Emirate of Waziristan' came into existence.

The Pakistani government still officially denies that it lost any territory. Rather, they claim that they simply signed accords with local tribes that meant that the tribes would take it upon themselves to ensure that none of the foreign "guests" residing in the region would take part in any terrorist acts.

The actual signatories of the accord were the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan. Of the patchwork of tribes in the area, only those whose leaders were Jihadis were recognized as signatories. Other tribes that were not so closely connected with the Taliban or other Jihadi groups were abandoned and found themselves now subject to Taliban-style rule - enforced by tribal rivals. In return for being given a free hand to do what they wished, the Pakistan army asked only that the Jihadis not attack them.

Interestingly the process was then repeated in a number of other tribal areas. As it so happened, under pressure from the United States, Pakistan allowed limited air-strikes to be carried out against a few targets in late 2006 and early 2007. Meanwhile, emboldened by their success, Jihadi groups started putting pressure on other other tribal agencies and even areas of Pakistan proper, forcing more concessions from the Pakistani government and fears from local tribes that they were being abandoned.

Thursday, 10 May 2007

Allah, America, Army and Awam!

Who says that Pakistani politicians can't come up with good sound-bites? The Chief Minister of Sindh, Dr. Arbab Ghulam Rahim recently declared that the government of President Musharaf has the support of "Allah, America, Army and Awam!" Awam, can be translated as the people, or the nation.

The proof as they say, is in the pudding. While the Chief Justice was making his triumphant way through the country, being met by crowds of thousands at every town he passed through, Mr. Musharaf addressed a 'Public Meeting' at Naukot in Tharparkar. The idea was that the meeting would show that Musharaf too has a large popular following.

Details for organising the meeting were handed over to the PML-Q who control the local government and understandably they did their utmost to make sure that the meeting was a success. For example, the police confiscated over 2000 vehicles (mostly buses and lorries) from surrounding areas so that they could be used to ferry supporters to the Public Meeting. The results of this were many, particularly for school children as they could not attend schools. Many schools were forced to shut for the day. Businesses and offices opened late or in some cases not at all as there was no public transport available.

But that's not all. In order to ensure the success of the Public Meeting, government offices were closed, and Civil servants and teachers were "asked" to attend.

So Dr. Arbab Ghulam Rahim, Allah, America and Army - maybe (though perhaps even these are wavering) but as for the support of the Awam - maybe not.

IZ