On US-Pakistani Relations and the Aid Affair

There is an interesting article in today's 'News' by Mosharraf Zaidi called 'Joe Biden's Massive Pakistan Discount'. He takes a look at the recently passed Biden-Lugar Bill in the States which pledges $1.5 billion a year to Pakistan over the next ten years if it meets certain conditions (prosecuting the war on terror and democratic institution-building).

Firstly Mr Zaidi criticises the bill, pointing out that Georgia, with a population of 26 million is getting $1 billion in aid, while Pakistan with a population of over 170 million is getting $1.5 billion. He helpfully provides the following statistics:

In 2006 America's $9.9 billion aid programme in Iraq represented a $353 US contribution per Iraqi. Jordan's comparatively meager $562 million package translated into about $91 per Jordanian. Afghanistan's $3.74 billion programme meant the US provided $114 in assistance for each Afghan. Egypt received $1.79 billion, or about $22 per Egyptian citizen. At $1.5 billion, America's Pakistan assistance package will provide less than $9 per Pakistani citizen (or $8.72 to be precise). The true extent of the discount can be gleaned not by comparisons to post-conflict zones, or countries with solid gold records of friendship with the US, but by a comparison with Georgia, which will get roughly $217 per citizen. In cold numerical terms this means that one Georgian is worth roughly 25 Pakistanis.

This first argument does not seem entirely fair. Firstly, the US is pledging $1.5 billion per year for ten years - in other words $15 billion. Which means that Pakistan would get roughly $80-odd per citizen. Still not a huge amount but fairly substantial. Also its worth pointing out that the aid to Georgia is split, with about $500 million sent this year and the rest to be decided on later.

Its also worth pointing out that Georgia, according to the NYT has received a total of $1.8 billion over the last 17 years, while since 9-11, Pakistan has received over $11 billion (admittedly mostly military aid, but then thats what the military government demanded) and that's not including loans through US-dominated lending institutions and loan deferments etc.

Still, the author's basic point has merit. $1.5 billion isn't going to be working any miracles. His second point seems to be much more pertinent. In his proposal on American policy with Pakistan, Joe Biden rightly said that the American relationship with Pakistan has to move from a transactional to a normal, functional one. But in tying strings to this aid and making it dependent on stopping the Taliban and fighting Al Qaeda, this bill brings the relationship right back to being transactional: Cash for blood.

This is bad for the Pakistani government. And its bad for the Americans as well. Mr Zaidi points out that the Pakistani state is clearly not an effective one - the whole raison d'etre of providing aid aimed at building governmental and economic infrastructure is to make it effective. Yet this aid is conditional on the Pakistani state acting effectively against the militants. This is not a winning strategy.

Far more astute would be a strategy which provides aid aimed at building institutional capacity regardless of the war on terror, and making military aid conditional of performance. This is what Joe Biden has suggested and there's no good reason not to go for this idea. Eventually the idea would sink in to the military types in Islamabad that their strategic interests would be furthered by dismantling the Jihadist framework of regional security than by hanging on to it.

Charlie Wilson's Chair

Via Twilight of the Weimar Era, we learn that UT Austin is establishing a chair in Pakistan Studies in their South Asian Studies department. And its named after Charlie Wilson! Yes, that's right, I said Charlie Wilson!

What better way to encourage the serious study of, and promote the nuanced understanding of Pakistani society, history and culture by naming a post after this man? (Pic: Time)

But the kicker is that under our good General, the Pakistani government was 'extending its services' to help raise money for the endowment. Yes, the Pakistani government always was good at extending its services to good ole Charlie Wilson, wasn't it.

Decline of the Empire?

As pointed out on the blog, 'Twilight of the Weimar Era', the Pentagon recently released a study called 'Military Advantage in History' which sought to examine empires across history in order to learn how to increase the longevity of the American Empire (the whole silly enterprise is explained here). You can download the article if you have time to spare and need a giggle or two.

I was reminded of this sorry episode when I read Juan Cole's brief note on the impending demise of the Musharraf Presidency. One commentator noted, "you can measure the demise of the Empire by the rate at which its satraps are falling and wringing their hands".

Personally I tend to find all this talk about the impending demise of Empires overwrought. I know the idea is extremely popular in Pakistan amongst the elite classes. Searching for signs of the coming decline of America verges on a national obsession. Still, there's something amusing about puncturing the pompous Imperium-nostalgia of certain American political scientists and foreign policy wonks by turning their own terminology of Empire against them. And with the events in Lebanon earlier this year and in Georgia more recently, one can't help but feel that at least some of the Empire's satraps are indeed in trouble.

America's Most Unwanted

So the poll results are in, and we now have a clearer picture of which countries Americans like and dislike. The country which Americans view most favorably: Canada. (No surprises there.) The country they view most unfavourably: Iran. (No surprises there either.)

What about Pakistan? Well its there near the bottom of the pile, just above Afghanistan and below Cuba and Saudi Arabia. A whopping 72% of respondents view Pakistan unfavourably. Well how about that.

Bonus factoid: Republicans are more likely to view Pakistan favourably than Democrats.

McCain? No Thanks.

As if this was not a good enough reason to hope McCain doesn't make it to the White House, there is also this. And here I was, fooled into thinking he was a reasonably sensible 'un (for a U.S. Presidential Candidate, which, truth be told, is setting the bar rather low).

Bibi, Kayani, Sharif, Mush and Bush: Round and Round They Go...

Over the weekend the recently engineered deal between Musharraf and Bhutto seemed to fall apart - apparently because Bhutto had taken to gleeful grandstanding while the anti-Emergency agitation was at its peak. Musharraf, a man with a legendary stubborn streak that does not respond well to pressure tactics, shoved right back. The deal brokered by the United States in an attempt to engineer a political solution to Musharraf's domestic woes and counter internal criticism that the Bush government was pandering to dictators while touting its "freedom agenda" elsewhere in the Muslim world was apparently under threat of collapsing altogether.

But it was essential to cobble some kind of deal together. Hence, the following sequence of events...

13th Nov: General Kayani's name starts being dropped in the American press as "a man widely admired within the Pakistani military and by members of Pakistani civil society." I'm not certain which members of Pakistani civil society they are talking about.

14th Nov: An article in the NYT, citing unnamed administration officials, says that the United States is looking at other options in Pakistan. The article not so casually name drops General Kayani.

14th Nov (Night-time) : Musharraf immediately amends the PCO to remove the power to lift the Emergency from the post of Military chief to that of President. It looks like transferring power from himself to himself. But it highlights and suggests a fear of the next Military Chief (Kayani) when he himself retires and becomes a civilian President.

15th Nov: State Department says that Negroponte will be going to Pakistan to "get Pakistan back on the road to constitutional democratic rule."

15th Nov (Night-time): The detention order for house-arrest of Benazir Bhutto is lifted hours before Negroponte arrives.

15th Nov: Analysts debate whether the United States is actually switching to support Kayani, or whether these leaks are orchestrated by the anti-Musharaf group in the Republican administration that has formed around Zalmay Khalizdad, trying to build pressure on the Bush administration to stop supporting Musharraf and switch to another power configuration in Pakistan.

16th Nov: Negroponte arrives in Pakistan for talks. He shuttles between various officials, meeting Musharraf and Kayani (twice) and talks to Benazir Bhutto as well.

16th Nov (Night-time): Nawaz Sharif calls on BB to "clarify her position" with regards to talks with Musharraf.

17th Nov: After a meeting with Negroponte, Musharraf agrees that all parties will be able to take part in elections, but that the Emergency will have to stay for the time being. Afterwards he flies to Karachi. Rumours of a prospective meeting between BB and Negroponte are dashed when BB also leaves for Karachi. Negroponte ignores a request for a meeting with lawyers.

17th or 18th Nov: Musharraf meets Benazir on Saturday night or Sunday.

18th Nov: Negroponte issues a statement from Pakistan calling for: elections, removal of uniform, release of political detainees and lifting of curbs on the media. No mention of the judiciary. In a pointed remark to BB, he calls for an end to political 'brinkmanship'.

18th Nov: Benazir gives an interview to CNN where she softens her stance and states that Musharraf is an honest man, and that she is 'waiting for' Musharraf to respond to Negroponte's message from Washington. She also says she was 'satisfied' by the U.S.'s message to Musharraf.

18th Nov: After the announcement that Musharraf intends to visit Saudi Arabia, speculation is rife that Nawaz Sharif may finally be willing to meet with Musharraf, something he apparently has refused to do previously.

19th Nov: In an article in the LA Times that boldly states that Musharraf resisted U.S. calls to end the Emergency is buried this little statement: "U.S. officials in Washington, speaking on condition of anonymity out of deference to Negroponte's diplomatic efforts, said that although Musharraf didn't make any commitments Saturday, they believed he might in time yield."

19th Nov: Supreme Court kicks out 5 of 6 challenges to Musharraf's election as President. The case filed by the PPP leader Makhdoom Amin Fahim is withdrawn voluntarily, underlining the de-escalation in the war of words between Bhutto and Musharraf.

And so the road to Musharraf's assuming the Presidency, removing his uniform, and reforming some kind of modus operandi with the PPP has been cleared, thanks to the efforts of the United States. What's interesting is that in an interview with a reporter for the Sunday Times, Musharraf's Attorney General had also threatened to revoke the NRO that granted Bhutto immunity from corruption charges. This was, obviously, reported on Sunday (18th Nov) but the article doesn't specify when in the previous week he made this threat. I'm guessing around the 15th, when BB was still in captivity.

Whats interesting is that in the same article, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain claims that the immunity for Bhutto is a ploy to divide the opposition. I reckon the PML(Q) will continue to campaign on an anti-Bhutto agenda, presenting her as a depraved, corrupt agent of America (not far wrong), out to destroy Islam and Pakistan, with the only hope being the PML(Q). Having said that, if Nawaz were to return, that would be a serious blow to the PML(Q). Much of Punjab is united in its dislike of Bhutto, but in a fair fight, the PML(N) may still give Q a run for its money.

On Robert Gates and the CIA Legacy

TomDispatch has an interesting 3-part article by Roger Morris on Robert Gates and his involvement in the Carter administration and the CIA in the 80s. It makes for interesting reading and is a good insight in to this coldest of cold warriors. Here's an extract from the third part, which starts off by documenting the ill-conceived assassination attempt of Lebanese cleric Muhammad Husain Fadlallah which killed 81 innocent bystanders and injure over two hundred more. The article goes on to show how:

As documents, testimony, and other revelations would later make clear, the Bir plot was typical of Reagan era covert actions, which would include: Illegal aid to drug-running Contras (at war with the left-leaning Sandinista government of Nicaragua); contraband arms sent to both Iraq and Iran (at war with each other); tens of millions of dollars to the anti-Soviet Catholic Church in Poland, but also to nun- and priest-murdering death squads in El Salvador; and, most fateful of all, hundreds of millions to Islamic fanatics in Afghanistan. In the Reagan administration's secret wars -- from Managua to Tripoli, Beirut to Kabul -- crucial decisions were often taken not in careful deliberation with the secretaries of state and defense, the national security advisor, or other top officials, to say nothing of the requisite Congressional committees, but when the CIA director and the president were alone.

Worth a read. Even if you are familiar with the period in question.

IZ

PBS Documentary: Endgame

After watching PBS' documentary 'Endgame', I'm astonished by just how little we knew of the strategic thinking behind the war in Iraq. In the day to day news reports of bombings, kidnappings and "security" operations, its often difficult to discern the larger picture. Its a true case of not seeing the forest for the trees.

PBS has pieced together an incredibly informative documentary. You can watch the entire thing on their website, which also has transcripts of interviews, links to articles and a informative timeline. This is, so far, the definitive account of the changing U.S. strategy in Iraq. Some really important points emerge which really help to deepen our understanding of what has come before, and what is happening now.

By now it is common knowledge that the military and pentagon planners had no post-invasion plan to secure Iraq. There were plans around, most notably one drawn up by the State Department, which were never seriously examined by the war party. One key failure that followed from this was the unwillingness of the American forces to provide security for the Iraqi people after the Saddam government fell. In the looting and violence that followed, groups of armed Iraqi men started banding together to provide security for their neighbourhoods - in these were the seeds of the various militias and insurgent groups that abound today.

What the documentary reveals is that the Americans never planned to secure the Iraqi population. Rumsfeld and his military plans were always looking for the quick exit strategy - they insisted that the U.S. army should try and withdraw as soon as possible. This was known as the 'Light Footprint' strategy. The idea was to withdraw to safe bases, train a new Iraqi army who would take up the security task as soon as they were ready, and then pull out of the country. Rumsfeld refused to countenance alternative strategies of 'clear & hold'.

The effects of this were numerous. Firstly, it allowed the militias free reign, allowing them to gain credibility and leverage. Secondly it allowed places like Fallujah to become safe havens for insurgent groups. The Iraqi army never managed to take over security operations, and with no security, chaos and bloodshed grew, reconstruction efforts stalled completely and the nascent Iraqi government continued to lose credibility in the eyes of Iraqis. Perhaps most ominously, Al-Qaeda was successful in its declared aim of sparking off a sectarian civil war. These failures were compounded by a military leadership obsessed with the focus on an 'Exit strategy' and a presidential administration that refused to admit the truth of what was happening, both to the U.S. public and to itself and consequently refused to make any difficult decisions.

It was only in 2006 that the movement to shift to a different strategy gained momentum - that was to take U.S. troops out of their safe bases and into the streets - to provide security for Iraqi civilians and 'clear and hold' neighbourhoods. This strategy needed a huge commitment of troops and money and so Bush dithered. Until, that is, the 2006 elections which led to a resounding defeat for the Republicans. Galvanized by this defeat, Bush sacked Rumsfeld, the main opponent of a 'surge', a move ironically enough, supported by Democrats. The head of the military in Iraq was also removed. The new plan was adopted, but once again watered down. It was considered politically too unpalatable to commit the kinds of numbers of troops a 'clear and hold' strategy needed. Instead of a 'surge', the U.S. generals were to get a 'dribble'.

IZ

Re: Debating American Islam

Slate.com recently published an illuminating online discussion on Islam in America. Particular emphasis was placed by one of the interlocutors on the idea that America was successful in integrating Muslims because of its culture of tolerance and acceptance, as well as the American tradition of bringing faith into the public realm.

Its an interesting argument and I think Mr. Aslan may be on to something, but I do think he downplays what is probably the most crucial aspect of the relative success or lack of success in the integration of Muslims in the west. To quote from his article:

After all, the majority of European Muslims come from impoverished immigrant families, while the majority of Muslims in the United States are either middle-class converts or educated immigrants. Sixty percent of Muslims in the United States own their own homes. Believe it or not, the median income for a Muslim household in America is greater than it is for a non-Muslim household.

I think there is something vital in understanding integration in these facts. Taking Britain as a case in point, the majority of Muslim immigrants came from Pakistan and Bangladesh during the economic boom years of the 50s and 60s to work in textile mills and other low-paying working class jobs. By the late 70s most of these mills had closed down and by the 80s, the working class as a whole was under relentless attack by Thatcherism and the whittling away of a range of welfare services.

It was under these circumstances that there was both a growing racism against 'Pakis' for taking away scarce jobs, as well as a growing reaction amongst 2nd generation immigrants against the traditionalism and quietism of their parents as well as the perceived threat of a racist British society. The 80s also saw a boom in the funding of fundamentalist Salafist ideology, since it was seen by the U.S. and its Saudi ally as a useful vaccine to secular Socialism and Communism and Iranian revolutionary Shiism. An industry of ideological materials (textbooks, schools, mosques, community centres etc.) developed and by the 90s had firmly lodged themselves in the ghettos of poor immigrants that existed in Europe. This reactionary ideology never reached critical mass in the U.S. due to the lack of Muslim ghettos and the highly mobile nature of the American urban or suburban middle and upper classes (which doesn't mean it doesn't exist, just that it has not been able to entrench itself fully).

IZ